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The TuRmoil wiThin The eliTe, 
The CouRse of The CRisis and 
The lefT
Two years after the open outbreak of the financial and eco-
nomic crisis, crisis-management has become a normalized 
everyday business. Increasingly, leading circles and the mass 
media of all core capitalist countries even claim that the end 
of the crisis is in sight. They admit that its effects cannot be 
overlooked, yet they are sure that the growth figures will once 
again point upwards. They claim that the worst excrescences 
of financial-market capitalism have been corrected and that 
at the same time they have learned how a catastrophe can be 
avoided through quick and decisive state intervention. At first 
sight, this is a broad consensus.  But is the crisis over – and is 
there broad consensus and unity within the ruling elites? 
a puRe fanTasy? 
In fact, the anti-cyclic action of the states and the social-polit-
ical cushioning measures they have taken is much more 
extensive – and effective – than those taken at the time of the 
last big crisis. The current stabilization of the economy is 
therefore not attributable to a durable recuperation of capital 
accumulation. It is above all the result of the stimulation of 
the economic cycle and support of the banking sector 
through national debt and the debt of many private house-
holds. The financial crisis and the crisis of the real economy 
are therefore not over but are proceeding very unevenly on a 
global scale.
In the crisis period of the last two years, the power constella-
tions within neoliberalism have started to shift markedly. Neo-
liberalism’s historical blocs, that is to say the bonds between 
rulers and ruled, have not only become fragile; in a certain 
way they have also melted down in most countries. And in a 
very few cases they have been pushed out of power. To deter-
mine where the present crisis will lead it is helpful to look at 
the ongoing turmoil among the ruling classes. 
In their just published excellent study «In and Out of Crisis» 
(Oakland 2010) Greg Albo, Sam Gindin and Leo Panitch state: 
«... it is pure fantasy to see significant splits between different 
sections of the capitalist classes or a fracturing of political 
parties...there has been no significant disunity amongst the 
main fractions of capital – between industrial capital and 
finance, between foreign and national capitals, and between 
big and small capitals. They have all seen their political stake 
in the resolution of the crisis in a way which reconstitutes 
neoliberal hegemony.» (p.37). Depicting the capitalist classes 
and their political expressions in a situation of deep crisis as 
something monolithic makes sense only in so far as one looks 
at the structural and static dimension of the power structure. 
Yet even this is not convincing: in Germany for example there 
are quite spectacular conflicts between industry and finance 
and between big and small capitals as well. 
However, to include only this structural dimension in one’s 
field of vision means to miss the dynamic dimension of devel-
opment. The factions and groups within the ruling classes 
have, for nearly two years now, been engaged in fierce strug-
gles over the current management of the crisis and possible 
strategic options. The crisis has brought the fragmented 
structure of this power bloc more visibly to light than ever 
before, for the individual power groups need media visibility 
in order to win over adherents and dominate the whole bloc. 
As an immediate resultat of the crisis and the struggles to 
control it we can see a remarkable rearrangment of the polit-
ical forces. Now there is the beginning of a second arrange-
ment: there is much evidence that the crisis has generated a 
new fragmented crisis-neoliberalism, in which various accu-
mulation models will be contested for a very long time to 
come. It is the specific model of finance-led accumulation 
which has come into crisis, and the future of this model is 
being questioned. The capitalist classes and their political 
representatives are organizing around exit strategies and 
dividing along these lines – this means that they are focuss-
ing on the old accumulation strategy and on new ones, with 
the avantgarde and their followers gathering around these 
new political paradigms. It is therefore true that there is con-
sensus, but at second and third glance there is also deep 
dissent.  
2diReCTions and faCTions 
Authoritarian
First, there is a consolidation of a politically fortified authoritar-
ian direction, as in countries like Austria, Italy, in part France, 
Eastern Europe, Russia, a large part of the oil countries and 
East Asia and China where it has a strong presence or is dom-
inant, and which by now possesses bastions within almost 
all governments. To overcome the long depression in effect 
since the late 1970s, it advocates rapid resumption of indus-
trial growth policy through a policy of strategic stateled accu-
mulation and assumes that the abrupt changes can be dealt 
with in a politically authoritarian (and, when necessary, impe-
rial) way. Nationalist or fascist formations have so far only 
been capable of connecting above all in Italy, Austria, France, 
some eastern and central European countries and in Russia 
– but this is impressive! 
Market Radical
Second, in contrast, extreme marketradical elements of the 
neoliberal power bloc have clearly been weakened. Their 
projects and rhetoric have lost consensus and the uncon-
tested ability to be put into practice, although they have not 
disappeared. It has lost its standing as a «theoretically inno-
vative» and «ideologically efficient» tendency connected to 
the future – its attempt to make the state into the cause of 
the crisis hardly has any resonance. This tendency has, it is 
true, frequently only accomplished tactical maneuvers and 
continues to be a component of the power block – only in 
exceptional peripheral cases (for example, in Iceland) has it 
been largely pushed out. It has for the most part lost its dom-
inant position within the neoliberal power bloc, but has at the 
same time – as in the case of the FDP in Germany – been able 
to become a dynamically acting collecting basin for net-
worked marketradical, often also bourgeois-liberal, formally 
constitutional forces of the middle and upper classes. The 
crisis for them naturally is not an «organic» or «structural» 
crisis, but only a major conjunctural one. This tendency 
praises inequality, fights against the idea and practice of 
basic social rights and presents itself as the preceptor of a 
new elitist meritocracy-based bourgeoisie. It only wants to 
have back the good old neoliberalism from the pre-crisis 
period, nothing more. 
Center-right
Third, in all capitalist countries (and especially in the FRG (the 
CDU/CSU), partly in France, England and in the eastern Euro-
pean countries, where it has been strengthened on the polit-
ical party level), a third center-right, social conservative group 
has been consolidated, which is both competing and forming 
coalitions with the first named group and which acts as a 
political means for the mediation of «market and state.» To 
this extent it is not only literally centrally positioned in the 
power-political business of crisis-management and predes-
tined for this function – and of playing at times the role of the 
center of crisisneoliberalism. In terms of the politics of hegem-
ony, it also continues to be electable and capable of connect-
ing to all social classes. Moreover, it has no more taken leave 
of the paradigms of lowintensity democracy, of imperial policy 
and of an international trade, with which competitive states 
compete for market shares, than have the above mentioned 
power groups. 
Social Democrats
Fourth and at least in European countries like Germany, Aus-
tria, Italy or England, the socialdemocratic reformist variants 
of neoliberalism have been virtually toppled, and they have 
not been able to draw strength from Obama’s reformist 
project, which is trying in the USA to build a competing 
reformist, liberal historic bloc. Only in few countries (north-
ern Europe, France, England) have they been able to hold 
their ground. The question is still open as to what will become 
of this post-democratic-neoliberal tendency of reformism, 
which has for more than a decade dominated the social-
democratic camp. Its political crisis continues unabated – 
whether it is in opposition or in government. In the upper and 
middle classes, it is losing its power positions and mass base 
to social-conservative neoliberalism. On the other hand, the 
precarious or unemployed, partly immiserated, subalterns, 
once represented by social democracy, have in Germany 
gone over to the anti-neoliberal LINKE, in France to the Left 
of the Left and the Left, and in Italy to the authoritarian right. 
Die LINKE increasingly faces the problem of how it simulta-
neously politically represents the insecure and declassed 
state-oriented underclass and libertarian middleclass groups. 
The crisis is aggravating the representation problem of the 
left. 
Dissidents
Fifth, the contradictoriness and fluidity of the present situation 
is shown by the fact that in almost all larger capitalist countries 
in the last year and a half, comparatively small, very heterog-
enous, groups have emerged, which are either associated 
with the neoliberal power bloc or have long competed with it 
without essentially gaining any influence, which act in a mora-
leconomic way and which in part clearly see themselves as 
postneoliberal. Often they represent a labile, ambivalent bour-
geois dissident milieu. Consequently, they are positioned in a 
transverse way and are found, as a result of the crisis and of 
the constant sharpening of the environmental crisis as a quasi-
opposition in all of the directions enumerated above. Their 
point of departure is a global, synchronous and multiple crisis 
of capitalism; they agitate for humanist, liberal (seldom liber-
tarian), ecological, reformist and at times also welfare-state 
goals above all of the middle class and of some young elite 
groups and often recruit strongly from the bourgeoisified 
Greens and from the vestiges of a social-democratic govern-
ment left in Europe. Politically, they frequently look to the 
Obama Administration or even to the left and center-left gov-
ernments of Latin America. Their vague ethical-political credo 
is in the words of a policy paper of the German social-demo-
cratic Friedrich Ebert Foundation, of August 2009: «What is 
appearing in the place of the failed capitalist model? How can 
a new capitalism – a capitalism 2.0 – look? It is clear that it has 
to become somehow different and somehow better» (FES 
Policy – Politische Akademie No. 31, August 2009, p.1). What 
is advocated is a «good capitalism,» a good governance, a good 
work,a good society and, finally, a good life. This is supposed 
to solve the multiple structural crises of capitalism and dis-
place assets-driven accumulation by a Green or Public New 
Deal. This is a new, very weak and ambivalent realm or culture 
but in terms of political strategy it is the most interesting 
development for the left. However, up to now, (1) these 
reformist groups, (2) the more radical greens and left-reform-
3ist tendencies (including the movement left), and (3) the 
socialist tendencies of the left (and of the left of the left) have, 
to a large extent, acted in isolation of each other. 
In the present crisis, such differentiations and changes in the 
constellations and hierarchies of power are often overlooked, 
because they have not lead to a dramatic exchange of political 
personnel – or they became confused with the beginning of 
the end of the neoliberal power constellation. If one looks at 
the protagonists and the completely capitaloriented results of 
their crisis management, one would diagnose continuity; if 
one instead looks at the action taken in the crisis and the 
instruments used, one would see a break or even an unex-
pected end of the neoliberal project. Both suppositions are 
short-sighted and premature. What are visible are strong dif-
ferentiations and shifts of position within the neoliberal power 
bloc. We are dealing here with a crisis-driven new fragmented 
neoliberalism. The contours of neoliberal power and the limits 
of the boundaries of the project are becoming blurred. New 
contradictions are emerging: while the old policy of deregula-
tion is being modified, the policy of privatization remains, and 
while the course of liberalization is being weakened the prac-
tice of financialization, thanks to the unique mobilization of 
public funds, remains unbroken. There are thus numerous 
projects of neoliberalism and also of post-neoliberalism, 
whose variants are intermeshed, overlap and compete with 
each other. Fragmentation does not necessarily mean decline. 
aCCumulaTion sTRaTegies
Fincancial Market Driven Neoliberalism
At present there is a precarious consolidation of the still dom-
inant financial-market-driven accumulation model, whose life 
span is not predictable. Consolidation means that bank policy 
is organizing recapitalization and is fighting insolvency; the 
central banks are gaining power; there is weak regulation and 
no action against risky financial-market instruments; fiscal 
policy is concentrating on redistribution; austerity policies are 
being exploded. 
In Europe, central strata of the skilled wage dependents are 
being protected from unemployment, though not from sig-
nificant losses of income, through reduced working hours 
and cyclical programs. A crisis corporatism was established, 
with the unions as clearly dependent partners. Nowhere have 
the unions been able to use the explosion of state intervention 
for interventions against the investment sovereignty of the 
owners. Two years after the outbreak of the crisis, neither a 
switch to an active sectoral and regional structural policy nor 
the expansion of co-determination to a politics of economic 
democracy is a theme. If one looks at the European economy 
of power, then the dominating position of France, Germany 
and England in financial markets as in the real economy has 
clearly been confirmed; even Poland and the northern Euro-
pean states, along with their neoliberal elites, have consoli-
dated their positions in Europe. However, Germany is the 
winner in the power play – at least for now. Others (like 
Greece, Spain, the Baltic States, Hungary) are loosers.
Inclusive Accumulation
Other central global players such as India are hardly touched 
by the financial crisis and are continuing along the path of 
their brand of neoliberal politics. As a parallel to this, in coun-
tries like Brazil and China strong domestic-market-oriented, 
inclusive growth and accumulation strategies are being pur-
sued, which aim at including enormous hitherto excluded 
peripheral sectors. They are trying to institute a change away 
from «fragmented accumulation» and to an inclusion of inter-
nal peripheries as a new driving force of global capitalism. 
Their huge internal markets help in recovering from the crisis 
and compensate the process of de-globalization. 
Green New Deal: the Race is on.
In the present anti-cyclic programs, the rudiments of a state-
led Green New Deal are being introduced: «... the countries are 
striving vigorously to get ahead in the race for pole position in 
the new green low-carbon economy,» as a just published new 
report on Germany’s environmental policies says. (Peer Review 
on Sustainable Development Policies in Germany, Berlin 
November 2009). Its representatives have no doubt that the 
country which lags behind in the struggle to establish green 
capitalism cannot achieve hegemony and profit domination in 
the capitalism of the future. The race is on.
It is indisputable that energy, resource and emission-intensive 
growth has come up against limits. Only the Green New Deal 
(GND) is a strategic concept that acknowledges the multiple 
crises and the irreversible overburdening of the ecosystem 
(usevalues), and can therefore also be a project of societal 
transformation. A variant of GND – the green capitalism 
project – even offers the promise of a new, still strongly 
assets-driven accumulation strategy, which would not for-
mulate a rejection of consumer capitalism – the first great 
invention of US capitalism – but promises its transformation 
through a strategy of resource efficiency. Put differently: 
financialization + solar energy = GND. In any case, there 
already exist varieties of green capitalisms – as concepts, 
projects and fragments – which are not to be equated with 
each other. The left variants of GND stand for a radical linking 
of ecology and the commons. 
Key pRoblems
In the Federal Republic the political concepts of the above-
named tendencies are confronted with four key problems:
1. Since 2003 Germany has piled up a balance of trade sur-
plus, vis-à-vis all other European countries, of almost 600 
billion, which in the case of all states led to negative job and 
salary effects. In no OECD country has social inequality 
grown in recent years so strongly as in Germany. The real 
economy of no other large capitalist country, with the 
exception of the USA, has been hit as hard by the crisis. 
The imperial export strategy of the FRG has no future, yet 
the policy of acting as the «supplier to the world» is deeply 
anchored in the culture and balance sheets of Germany’s 
industrial and economic policy. The political will for a tran-
sition to a world trade based on comparative advantages 
is nowhere to be seen. So far it is impossible to discern 
which political protagonists could initiate and arrange, 
through a reproportioning of investments, domestic con-
sumption and export, a short- and middle-term entry into 
another economic, trade and industrial policy, which would 
be shaped in an environmentally compatible and resource-
efficient way (Rainer Land).
2. None of these tendencies – not even the reformist and left 
one – has an even partially worked out concept, capable of 
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consensus and hegemony, for dealing with the explosion 
of the national debt which is the result of the predatory 
behavior of the too-big-to-fail banks. Until now, almost 
everything points to an equally explosive continuation of 
redistribution and a further weakening of public budgets 
and consequently of the public sector. As a result of the 
crisis we have the problem of a handful of imperial nation-
states acting as ideal collectiv bankers (Altvater). Tax policy 
is beginning to become a still more central political area for 
the left (also for the trade unions, which hardly interests 
them).
3. The distribution question has been back now for quite some 
time and is, in terms of the results of the crisis, thus far 
much more serious than it previously had been. Competi-
tion and a policy of making the relatively poor subsidize the 
completely poor will spread still further, so that the de-
solidarizing divisive effects of distribution policy – now 
more than ever in the last decades between the smart mid-
dle class and the superfluous underclass – will become 
greater. Above all in the society of the smart people 
(Rosenau) cultures of non-recognition and resentment will 
spread still further. For this reason, also, job creation, the 
robust securing and rapid creation of jobs, is the central 
task of the left.
The situation of over-accumulation and of financial specula-
tion has been retained through the interventions of central 
banks and governments, and a «soft» transition to a phase of 
accelerated accumulation of capital is not foreseeable, par-
ticularly because for the world economy the US citizen, still 
considered the consumer of last resort, who ensured growing 
demand, has disappeared, and there is no substitute in sight. 
ConClusion
In short: in the most recent crisis, the leaders have effected 
modifications, opened up new options and at least partially 
integrated challengers. The hegemonic bloc was clearly 
changed; the power constellations within the ruling classes 
have been considerably altered – a newly fragmented crisis 
neoliberalism has arisen. The global shift in favor of Asia has 
accelerated; in particular the US, Japan and the EU have been 
hit by the crisis, and the global spatial order of accumulation 
is changing. In Europe, the social-democratic and market-
radical directions have clearly been weakened. A new center-
right-wing of crisis-neoliberalism is forming (Sarkozy, Merkel). 
For them, there is no thought of a fundamental, strategic 
departure from the neoliberal development model of capital-
ism, but in the struggle over crisis management and accumu-
lation models the different factions and directions intermingle. 
Before our eyes a new period is beginning, but are we seeing 
it? It is conceivable, but we do not know it. Today it cannot tell 
if a new regulation type will develop. However, it is more 
probable than ever that, nearly a half century since Rachel 
Carson published Silent Spring, we are standing at the begin-
ning of a dynamic turn to a massive ecologization of capital-
ism. The question is open whether this will be a new type of 
capitalism. Whether alongside a Green New Deal there will 
also be a Public New Deal and a Social New Deal and, finally, 
even a participatory capitalism (Land) or a socialism that incor-
porates the commons, justice and democracy – this is now 
really open and depends , of course, on the very, very long-
term persistence and patience of the left. 
Nowhere has the turmoil within the elites resulted in a major 
breakthrough for the left – and in view of the three decades 
under the shadow of an historic defeat, this was admittedly 
not to be expected. The left doesn’t fall from heaven. The 
great crisis is not over; unemployment and national debt are 
now at its center. They are the key political questions of the 
coming years.
Translation: Eric Canepa
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